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  Chapter I: Introduction
The most well-known scholarly perspective on why the Taliban and al Qaeda rose 
to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s can be traced back to the term blowback, Chalmers 
Johnson’s term for the unintended negative consequences of well-intentioned American 
foreign policy. Originally used by Johnson to describe the fallout from American 
involvement in East Asia, blowback has become increasingly associated with the failings 
of American policy in South Asia and the Middle East. Given Johnson's experience as a 
consultant for the CIA, it is only appropriate that he was the first major academic to alert 
the public about the ramifications of the CIA's unchecked power.1 It is also worth noting 
that Johnson wrote this book in the wake of the increasing criticism being levied against 
President George W. Bush for launching America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq due to bad 
intelligence regarding Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction.  
 The majority of the academic writing on the emerging subject of the Taliban and 
al Qaeda’s ascent tend to place the blame squarely at the feet of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) for funding the mujahedeen, many of whom would eventually go on to 
have rather successful careers as members of either the Taliban or al Qaeda, with the 
most famous of all obviously being Osama bin Laden. The most famous of the books 
written about the CIA’s role in the formation of al Qaeda and the Taliban is George 
Crile’s Charlie Wilson’s War, also written in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
which describes how the playboy congressman from Texas convinced his colleagues, 
with the help of a friend in the CIA and several other sources, funded the mujahedeen in 
                                                          
1 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York City: Holt 
Paperbacks, 2004). 
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their fight against the invading Soviet Union, who was America’s archnemesis at the 
time. Unfortunately, as evident when he said “My God, what have we done?”, upon first 
seeing about the 9/11 attacks on the news, he did not fully comprehend the possibility 
that the rebels that he authorized the CIA to assist could someday turn their backs on their 
benefactors.2 The book, which honestly reads more like a novel than a scholarly work, 
received even more attention when it was later adapted into a popular motion picture 
starring Tom Hanks and Julia Roberts. Charlie Wilson is not the only work that supports 
this theory of blowback. Steve Coll also believes that 9/11 and the rash of al Qaeda 
attacks on American targets throughout the 1990s was a direct result of ignorance on the 
part of the CIA. Coll’s work not only outlines the numerous blunders made by the CIA 
and its associate organizations both during and after the Soviet-Afghan War, but also 
provides an intimate look at the lives of the mujahedeen rebels who sought to keep the 
Red Army out of their homeland. Another book which considers the CIA to be chiefly 
responsible for both 9/11 and the aforementioned spate of al Qaeda attacks in the 1990s is 
Peter Dale Scott’s The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America3. This 
tome posits that a “deep state” truly pulls the strings of America’s government and has 
been desperately trying to conceal the many crimes that have committed around the globe 
in the name of preserving America’s empire.  
One author who rejects this theory of “blowback” is Peter Bergen, whose book 
Holy War Inc. takes a look at the role the CIA played in al Qaeda’s rise to prominence 
with a particular emphasis on Osama bin Laden, whom Bergen has the distinction of 
                                                          
2 George Crile III, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress 
and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003). 
3 Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 2008). 
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being the first ever person to interview him on television. He eventually concludes in his 
chapter on the CIA that, although major mistakes were certainly made in the way the CIA 
handled the Soviet-Afghan conflict, their overall responsibility for al Qaeda and the 
Taliban’s creation has been grossly exaggerated by the media over the years.4 Bergen is 
not alone in absolving the CIA from having any responsibility for al Qaeda and the 
Taliban’s creation, as Mohammad Yousaf, in The Battle For Afghanistan, co-written with 
Mark Adkin, contends that the CIA had very little, if any responsibility for the Taliban 
and al Qaeda’s descent, since the CIA only provided the money and weapons for the 
mujahedeen and did not train them.5  
Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, along 
with its’ miniseries adaptation, posits that al Qaeda was able to carry out 9/11 was 
because the CIA and FBI have historically had considerable difficulties communicating 
with each other, which allowed al Qaeda to fly under the radar at the worst possible time. 
As a result, he believes that the best way to respond to the threat of terrorism in the future 
is through reforming these organizations to improve relations between them.6 Mark 
Riebling’s aptly titled Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War between 
the FBI and CIA has Endangered National Security, is another excellent work about the 
legendary rivalry between the FBI and CIA. This somewhat depressing read paints a 
fascinatingly dark picture of the numerous profound cultural and technological 
differences between the two agencies, along with the well-deserved reputation of 
                                                          
4 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc. (New York City: Simon & Schuster, 2001). 
5 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets Versus the Mujahideen 
during the 1980s. (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 1992) 
6 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). 
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American bureaucracy to get very little done. As a result of this ineptness, the American 
intelligence community was painstakingly slow to adapt to the new security challenges 
that the nation faced in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War.7 
The truth is that the CIA was only one of a myriad of factors that contributed to 
the Taliban and al Qaeda’s reign of terror in both Afghanistan and a large swath of the 
Western world. One factor was their immediate neighbor to the east, Pakistan, who likely 
viewed Afghanistan as a powerful buffer against potential aggression from their 
archnemesis India. Although both Peter Dale Scott and Michael Griffin both noted that 
the CIA did give generously to the mujahedeen in their jihad against the Soviet Union, 
the Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s version of the CIA, had the final say on who 
received the monies. Unfortunately for the United States, Pakistan preferred to fund the 
more fundamentalist-leaning members of the mujahedeen such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 
than the considerably more moderate fighters, such as Ahmad Shah Masood, that the CIA 
would have rather helped. In addition to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia (who Osama bin Laden’s 
family’s construction company had a close business relationship with) also has been 
accused of being a major benefactor to the Taliban and al Qaeda, likely in no small part 
due to the fact that the Wahhabi school of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia is strikingly 
similar to Islam as it was practiced in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s rule there. Scott 
and Crile both offer excellent explanations as to just how close the relationship was 
between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban.  
                                                          
7 Mark Riebling, Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War between the FBI and CIA has 
Endangered National Security (New York City. Simon and Schuster, 2010). 
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 Although the CIA certainly deserves some of the blame for al Qaeda and the 
Taliban becoming a headache for the Western world (particularly because they were not 
more forceful in demanding that the ISI send their money to moderate mujahedeen 
fighters instead of the Islamic fundamentalists Pakistan preferred), they were far from the 
only guilty party when it comes to bearing responsibility for the Taliban and al Qaeda. 
Whether talking about the close political and military ties between Afghanistan and both 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia or ideological influences such as Sayyid Qutb, there is 
certainly no shortage of directions in which one can point fingers as to why al Qaeda and 
the Taliban were able to become as successful as they were. Not to mention the fact that, 
despite the popular belief to the contrary, it was Pakistan’s ISI, and not the CIA, who 
provided all of the in-field training for the mujahedeen. Additionally, other American 
government agencies, particularly the State Department and the FBI, did an 
embarrassingly bad job of keeping individuals suspected of having terrorist ties out of the 
United States throughout the 1990s. The KGB spread propaganda and disinformation in 
an attempt to ruin the mujahedeen’s reputation among Afghanis. Finally, noted Islamist 
Hassan al-Turabi personally invited both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to 
live in Sudan after they had been expelled from their home countries of Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan. Turabi quickly publicly came to bin Laden and al-Zawahiri’s defense a few years 
later after Al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni 
Mubarak. 
In the first chapter, the legitimacy of the “blowback” theory will be closely 
examined, primarily through the works of Crile, Coll, and Scott. These authors shed light 
on how much of a role the CIA played in the mujahedeen’s success against the Soviet 
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Union in Afghanistan and the eventual transformation of select mujahid from freedom 
fighters forever indebted to Washington into the religious fanatics that tried to bring 
down the World Trade Center a few years later. 
The next chapter will discuss another potential lost opportunity involving the CIA 
that may have inadvertently helped al Qaeda carry out all those attacks against American 
targets in the 1990s as well as 9/11: the agency’s longstanding feud with the FBI. 
Lawrence Wright and Mark Riebling expose the lack of communication between these 
two legendary agencies89. This rift had the unfortunate effect of preventing them from 
working together in order to keep America safe from the new threat of Islamic terrorism 
that had emerged out of the ashes of the end of the Cold War. In addition this thesis will 
also examine several plots that al Qaeda intended to carry out but were fortunately foiled 
by American and foreign law enforcement. 
Finally, after all of these factors have been closely examined, we will which, if 
any party, bears the most guilt for al Qaeda and the Taliban becoming the monsters they 
are now known as. Considering the complexities surrounding these various factors, 
narrowing the culprit down to one will certainly not be an easy feat. 
  
                                                          
8 Wright, The Looming Tower. 
9 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (Sterling VA, Pluto 
Press: 2001). 
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Chapter II: Background and the Cases for and Against CIA Guilt 
Why the CIA got Involved and the Case for Culpability. 
 The American event most associated with Chalmers Johnson’s idea of 
“blowback” is, far and away, Operation Cyclone, the CIA-led covert operation to provide 
funding and weapons to the mujahedeen of Afghanistan during their war with the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s. Of all the books written about this controversial subject, the best 
academic treatise on the topic is Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars (2004). Beginning with the 
events immediately leading up to the Soviet invasion and ending the day before the tragic 
events of September 11th, Coll lays out a comprehensive study of the CIA’s role in the 
Soviet-Afghan conflict, the major players from the mujahedeen that the CIA financed, 
and how the CIA effectively dropped the ball by supporting the more fundamentalist 
mujahedeen ones Pakistan preferred instead of the more moderate members. With that in 
mind, now is good of a time as any to take a look at the chief beneficiaries of the CIA’s 
financial assistance.  
Abdul Haq was born into a rather distinguished Pashtun family near Jalalabad, 
like a disturbing number of other jihadis. Unusually for a member of the mujahedeen, 
however, religion did not appear to be a significant factor in his personal motivations for 
taking up arms against the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Haq would eventually become an 
exceptionally valuable asset in the CIA’s future efforts to aid the mujahedeen.10  
 Another major player in the mujahedeen who would eventually become one of the 
Taliban’s fiercest critics in the 1990s – a position that would eventually prove to be his 
                                                          
10 Ibid, 68. 
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undoing, was Tajik Ahmed Shah Masood. Unlike Haq, Masood was a piously devout 
Muslim. After the United States left Afghanistan to fend for itself after the 1989 Soviet 
withdrawal, Masood continued to fight the good fight and attempted to prevent the 
Taliban from rising to power. Although he failed in this pursuit, Masood was a constant 
thorn in the Taliban’s side throughout the remainder of the 1990s, continuing to fervently 
push for increased women’s rights as well as the overall secularization of Afghanistan, as 
opposed to the almost cartoon-like Wahhabi style of theocracy imposed upon the Afghan 
people by the Taliban.11 Even though Masood was understandably disappointed that the 
United States had effectively abandoned him and the mujahedeen after the departure of 
the Soviets, the Taliban, and by extension, al Qaeda, still considered Masood to be both 
still dangerously close enough to the United States and personally a threat to their 
stranglehold on power to assassinate him two days before the September 11th attacks, 
assumedly to prevent him from becoming an invaluable asset in the United States 
eventual efforts to both oust the Taliban and capture Osama bin Laden. 
 Another important member of the mujahedeen who would go on to considerably 
mold the ideology of the Taliban was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. One of the biggest 
recipients of funding from both the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies, 
Hekmatyar would later gain widespread scorn and criticism for his military tactics, which 
caused far more civilian deaths than those of Soviet troops. Also, in a preview of things 
to come under the Taliban regime, women in areas under his control were subject to strict 
restrictions on their movement and behavior. Two notably disturbing incidents author 
Andrew Hartman notes in “‘The Red Template’: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied 
                                                          
11 Ibid, 19-25. 
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Afghanistan” were throwing acid on the faces of women who refused to wear veils and 
an attack in 1980 on a Soviet school where girls were taught alongside boys.12  
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Hekmatyar became one of 
the leading figures in the Taliban during the subsequent Afghan Civil War, where his 
infamously ruthless tactics in combat all but assured a Taliban victory. His Wahhabi-
influenced ideology would later be a profound influence on the way the Taliban ruled 
Afghanistan once they came to power, most famously through their severe curtailing of 
women’s rights and their strict prohibitions on any Western influences that could even 
remotely be conceived as “fun”, such as sports, music, movies, and television. 
Amazingly, as a recent New York Times article revealed, even more than thirty years 
later, Hekmatyar is still as involved as ever in Afghanistan’s government, recently 
returning to the negotiation table with President Ashraf Ghani in an attempt to bring some 
semblance of stability to one of the most tragically war-torn nations in modern history.13 
 As evident by the differing identities of Haq, Masood, and Hekmatyar, 
Afghanistan, largely as a result of its treacherously rugged terrain, is divided into 
numerous diverse ethnic groups, which are, then again, as a result of the country’s 
geography, further divided into hundreds of tribes. In another report released by the CIA 
in 1980, the agency interestingly pointed out that the importance of tribal loyalties varied 
widely throughout the country, with Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Nuristanis being more loyal to 
their tribes, likely as a result of their traditional ways of life. In contrast, Uzbeks and 
                                                          
12 Andrew Hartman, "'The Red Template': US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan." Third World 
Quarterly 23, no. 3 (June 2002), 467-9. 
13 Andrew E. Kramer, "Once-Feared Afghan Warlord Is Still Causing Trouble, But Talking Peace." The 
New York Times, March 4, 2018. Accessed March 5, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/asia/afghanistan-gulbuddin-hekmatyar.html. 
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Turkmen felt relatively little loyalty to any particular tribe. Due to these varying degrees 
of loyalty exhibited by these numerous ethnic groups, the Soviet Union had fairly limited 
success in utilizing divide-and-conquer methods in their attempts to win over the hearts 
and minds of the Afghan people. On one hand, the more secular Uzbeks and Turkmen 
were likely easier to sway towards the communist camp. On the other hand, the more 
devout Pashtuns and Tajiks, whose members were for the most part were piously devout 
Muslims, would have been a considerably tougher sell for the Soviet Union.14 In another 
report released by the Defense Intelligence Agency two years later, intelligence officials 
highly praised the resolve of the insurgency against the superior firepower of the Red 
Army, while also citing the ever-important role of Afghanistan’s legendary geography in 
keeping the Soviet military in a constant uphill battle to confine the mujahedeen to one 
area.15 
 Although many scholars have claimed that the Wahhabi/Salafist ideology so 
closely associated with the Taliban and al Qaeda came from the Arabs that came to fight 
for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the evidence indicates this influence is grossly 
overhyped. Multiple sources have indicated that the mujahedeen saw the Afghan Arabs 
as a considerable nuisance, believing that their religious fanaticism prevented them from 
truly understanding the threat the Soviets posed to Afghanistan’s sovereignty. 
 Another author who promoted the CIA-Taliban/al Qaeda connection was George 
Crile, who made quite a name for himself with the publication of his bestseller Charlie 
                                                          
14 United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Political Analysis. The 
Soviets and Tribes of Southwest Asia. Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, 1980. 
15 United States. Defense Intelligence Agency. Directorate for Research. Afghan Resistance. By Gordon 
Negus and Chuck Witten. Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1982. 
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Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History. The 
book, along with its’ subsequent adaptation into a major Hollywood film starring Tom 
Hanks and Julia Roberts, dramatically increased the American public’s interest in the 
CIA’s role in the Taliban and al Qaeda’s creation. While Charlie Wilson plays a central 
role in Coll’s Ghost Wars, the novel-like style of Charlie Wilson’s War makes it much 
more digestible for the average reader. 
  Charles Nesbitt Wilson could best be described, at first glance, as the 
Congressional equivalent of Dos Equis’ “Most Interesting Man in the World”. A liberal 
Democrat in the traditionally deep red state of Texas, Wilson quickly gained a reputation 
among his colleagues in the House of Representatives as a consummate connoisseur of 
booze, drugs, beautiful women, and the finer things in life. Quite appropriately enough, 
his first glimpse of the desperate plight of Afghanistan’s mujahedeen occurred while in a 
hot tub surrounded by bombshells during a cocaine-fueled bender at Las Vegas’ iconic 
Caesars Palace hotel and casino in late June of 1980. One night while Wilson was 
carousing with numerous women in a Jacuzzi, a TV set in the room happened to be tuned 
to CBS Evening News where Dan Rather – on the cusp of replacing the incomparable 
Walter Cronkite as lead anchor, was serving as a correspondent in Afghanistan reporting 
on the tragic plight of the countless Afghanistan refugees who had fled for greener 
pastures in neighboring Pakistan. These harrowing images served to prove that Charlie 
Wilson, a man who on the surface could understandably be perceived by the uninitiated 
observer as nothing more than a narcissistic playboy on a power trip, truly possessed a 
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heart of gold.16 Over course of the decade, Wilson used his renowned Texan charm, 
ability to cross the political divide, and numerous foreign connections – most notably in 
Israel, to embark on a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan that would play a measurable 
part in the eventual downfall of the Soviet Union, eventually becoming the biggest arms 
deal of the 1980s despite the greater fame of the Iran-Contra deal. To Wilson’s credit, 
upon finding out that the September 11th attacks had happened, he immediately realized 
the tragic consequences of his earlier actions, as evident by his first words upon seeing 
the Twin Towers on the verge of collapse: “My God, what have we done?”  
 Although Wilson was far and away the most well-known public figure associated 
with the CIA’s operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s, he was not the only man 
responsible for convin cing Congress to take the tremendous gamble of meddling in the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Yale graduate and Pittsburgh native Gustav “Gust” 
Avrakotos, the son of Greek immigrants, had joined the CIA in 1962. When he first came 
to Langley, he was initially assigned to an anti-communist operation in Greece due to his 
knowledge of the language.17 This experience working to defeat communism wherever it 
could be found made Afghanistan all the more alluring of a workplace for Gust. 
However, his anticommunist mentality was not the only thing that made Afghanistan so 
enticing, as he also saw numerous similarities between himself and the countless Afghan 
refugees he encountered in the camps in Pakistan as well as the mujahedeen themselves, 
such as the very hardy lifestyle of the Afghan people and their love of lamb meat, a 
                                                          
16 Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, 24-39. 
 
17 "Gust Avrakotos." Wikipedia, February 17, 2018. Accessed February 21, 2018. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gust_Avrakotos. 
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commonality they shared with his fellow Greeks.18 As Gust gradually assumed more and 
more responsibility for the CIA’s operations in Afghanistan, he became increasingly 
frustrated by the ridiculous amount of bureaucratic red tape that stood in the way of the 
CIA ramping up their efforts to assist the mujahedeen in bleeding the Soviets dry. In 
order to get around this irritating bureaucratic run-around, Gust would intentionally make 
the internal communications with his colleagues regarding the weapons to be provided to 
the mujahedeen as ambiguous as possible. In one particularly memorable passage from 
Charlie Wilson’s War, Crile mentions that his dealings with the CIA lawyers became so 
ridiculously absurd that, in his words, “Saturday Night Live couldn’t even do it justice”.19  
 During the later years of the Soviet-Afghan conflict, a terrifying new weapon 
suddenly came into play that permanently altered the course of the war – the Stinger 
missile. This heat-seeking shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapon quickly shifted the 
direction of the conflict in the mujahedeen's favor. Prior to the introduction of this 
horrifying weapon, Soviet aircraft regularly humiliated the mujahedeen, who up to this 
point relied on relatively obsolete weapons to take on the Red Army. Initially, there were 
considerable reservations within the CIA about giving the mujahedeen such advanced 
technology, which was certainly understandable given the fears of some in the agency 
that the missiles could fall into improper hands once the war came to a close. At first, the 
Soviet Air Force was taken completely off guard, with pilot losses mounting quickly. 
However, the Soviets subsequently adapted to this innovative technology by putting heat-
radiating attachments on their helicopters in order to deliberately confuse the Stinger's 
                                                          
18 Crile, 224. 
19 Ibid, 240-1. 
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heat-seeking technology. In the years since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, there has been 
much lively debate among scholars and historians as to exactly how large of a role the 
Stinger played in making the Soviet Union leave Afghanistan when they did. One party 
argues that the innovative technology overwhelmed the Soviet air force primarily because 
they were unable to develop effective technology to counter these missiles. Another side 
argues that the Stinger's impact on the timing of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 
is dramatically overestimated, as deteriorating domestic conditions within the Soviet 
Union, combined with the increasing toll of the Afghanistan conflict on Moscow's 
coffers, proved to be an increasingly unsustainable situation, and that something had to 
give eventually, that something eventually being the occupation of Afghanistan. The last 
side claims that Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was inevitable primarily because of 
the new wave of young officials such as Mikhail Gorbachev who were making their way 
into the Kremlin and increasingly saw Soviet efforts to maintain their empire throughout 
the world as an increasingly wasteful use of the nation's resources when their citizens 
were suffering so much.20 
One of the most important individuals when it comes to the responsibility of what 
would eventually become al Qaeda’s reach into the United States was Egyptian double 
agent Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed. A former translator for Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mohamed 
was later enlisted by the CIA to recruit American Muslims to fight for the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan, which he did at Farouq Mosque’s al Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn. 
This facility would subsequently also be used as a recruiting center by Maktab al-
                                                          
20 Alan J. Kuperman, "The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan ." Political Science 
Quarterly 114, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 219-63. 
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Khidmat founder Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and Omar Abdel-Rahman. Most importantly, 
however, it would come to be the training ground for 1993 World Trade Center bomber 
Ramzi Yousef. As Peter Dale Scott notes in his book The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, 
and the Future of America, Azzam preferred to recruit mujahedeen from the United 
States because free speech was much more heavily restricted in the Middle East.21 Also, 
during this time, he managed to impressively work his way up the ranks in the United 
States Army, eventually achieving the rank of drill sergeant. Unfortunately for the United 
States, Mohamed was eventually able to successfully parlay the numerous martial skills 
he had acquired in the Army to train such notable names as al-Zawahiri and bin Laden in 
various terrorist tactics.22 His story gets even more interesting when one considers that, 
before he joined the U.S. Army, Mohamed had served as a captain in the Egyptian Army. 
His first taste of American military experience came via a foreign officer training 
program offered by the U.S. Army before offering to defect to the CIA and become a spy. 
Eventually, his willingness to help both sides out would work in his favor, as he ended up 
making a lucrative plea deal in exchange for turning on Osama bin Laden in his trial over 
his involvement in the 1998 United States Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.23 
Peter Dale Scott is a particularly fascinating proponent of the “blowback” theory due to 
his belief not only that the CIA was responsible for the Taliban and al Qaeda, but that a 
“deep state” within the federal government has been hard at work for decades trying to 
                                                          
21 Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2008) 122. 
22 https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline//////torture/interviews/cloonan.html 
23 Tom Hays and Sharon Theimer, "In Life of Double-Crosses, Egyptian Worked with Green Berets and 
bin Laden" Black Hills Pioneer, 26 December 2001. 
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conceal from the American public the numerous crimes committed around the globe by 
the CIA on America’s behalf.   
As Sebastian Schnelle argues, the aforementioned Azzam, not bin Laden, may 
very well be more responsible for al Qaeda becoming the terrorist juggernaut it is known 
as today. Considering Azzam’s earlier calls for all Muslims to take up arms whenever 
they felt Islam was under attack, he can certainly be considered the textbook case of the 
famous adage among historians that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter”. Like fellow al Qaeda founders Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden (which 
will be elaborated on more later), Azzam was a devout student of both Sayyid Qutb and 
Hassan al-Banna during his formative years as a university student. In 1979, following 
the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, Azzam published his seminal fatwa 
(Islamic judicial opinion) “Defense of the Muslim Lands”, whose subsequent approval by 
Saudi Grand Mufti24 Sheik Abdul Aziz bin Bazz, effectively set the pendulum in motion 
for the mujahedeen’s ruthless jihad against their Soviet overlords. Much like Saudi 
Arabia, Afghanistan at the beginning of the Soviet war suffered from an embarrassing 
lack of manpower, which led Azzam to call for all able-bodied Muslim males in the 
world to come and defend Afghanistan from these “godless brutes.” In 1983, Azzam met 
Osama bin Laden and the two quickly became close allies. Thanks to bin Laden’s 
family’s close connections with the Saudi government as a result of his father’s 
construction business, thousands of young men from across the Middle East converged 
                                                          
24 Grand Mufti is the highest official of religious law in a Sunni or Ibadi Muslim country 
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onto Afghanistan in order to avenge what they perceived to be nothing less than a 
blasphemous attack on their sacred faith.25 
Tragically, Ali Mohamed was not the only person the United States made the 
dangerous mistake of allowing into America. As Thomas Copeland once again states, 
another wolf in sheep’s clothing was Wael Hamza Julaidan. During the mid-1980’s 
Julaidan became president of the Tuscon Islamic Center, after which he returned to 
Afghanistan to begin training mujahedeen fighters. A few years after the end of the 
Soviet-Afghan War, Julaidan once again began working with the World Muslim League 
in Bosnia, which was beginning to deal with a devastating war. With Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan refusing to take in the aspiring mujahedeen fighters due to the legitimate threat 
they posed to their governments, Bosnia seemed just as good of a place as any for the 
army to offload the young jihadi who had learned his craft at the infamous al-Kifah 
Mosque in Brooklyn.26 
 After the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, a serious new internal conflict began to 
emerge within the CIA. Now that a major power vacuum had emerged in regard to who 
would rule Afghanistan in the long-term, the CIA now had to make the difficult decision 
of which of the warring parties to support. As the then-current president, Mohammad 
Najibullah, had strong ties to Moscow, Washington obviously did not want him to remain 
in power. These anticommunist stalwarts considered Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to be 
Afghanistan’s best hope for long-term stability, in spite of his ultra-fundamentalist 
religious beliefs, a point that was duly noted by the more moderate voices within the 
                                                          
25 Sebastian Schnelle, 2012, “Abdullah Azzam, Ideologue of Jihad: Freedom Fighter or Terrorist?” Journal 
of Church and State 54 (4): 625-47. 
26 Scott, The Road to 9/11, 124-30. 
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CIA. These more moderate individuals within the CIA threw their support behind Ahmad 
Shah Masood, who, given his more secular views on how Afghanistan should be 
governed, would have been, in hindsight, the most ideal mujahedeen leader for the United 
States to support in the crucial first post-Soviet years.27 However, Pakistan’s ISI 
controlled the CIA’s purse strings, so the funding ultimately ended up going to 
Hekmatyar. In any event, this internal crisis at Langley would ultimately prove 
meaningless, as the 1992 Peshawar Accord establishing a post-war interim government 
would result (despite the fierce objections of bin Laden) in the creation of a highly 
praised coalition government that included members of both Masood and Hekmatyar’s 
organizations. Masood’s primary reasoning behind the creation of a coalition government 
was rather honorable, as he believed that all of the parties that had been involved in 
driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan should have an equal say in how the nation was 
governed.28  
Four years after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, the Stinger missiles that the 
United States had secretly given the mujahedeen in order to bring down the Soviet 
aircraft which rained down terror on the innocent civilians of Afghanistan were finally 
turned back onto American forces. Trained by the same mujahedeen who had driven the 
Soviets out of Afghanistan, several members of the Somali militia brought down three 
Black Hawk helicopters using a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher during the 
Battle of Mogadishu several years after the mujahedeen had emerged victorious in 
                                                          
27 Coll, Ghost Wars, 190-99. 
28 Nojumi Neamatollah, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the 
Future of the Region. (New York: Palgrave, 2002) 112. 
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Afghanistan. This event would subsequently be made famous around the world after it 
was immortalized in Ridley Scott’s 2001 film Black Hawk Down.29 
  Another historical event that provides damning evidence of the CIA’s at least 
partial role in the creation of what would come to be al Qaeda is the infamous 1993 
bombing of the World Trade Center. Carried out a few weeks after the inauguration of 
President Bill Clinton, the attack served as a rude awakening to Americans that they were 
no longer immune from the kinds of terrorist attacks that had, up until that point, been 
largely seen as phenomenon exclusive to foreign countries. The mastermind of these 
attacks was Omar Abdel-Rahman, commonly referred to as “the blind sheikh/cleric” due 
to his disability. The attack itself was carried out by Ramzi Yousef, who was, 
interestingly, the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 
attack. As Peter Lance claims, Abdel-Rahman first arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1988 
after serving prison time in Egypt. While there, he met Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, founder 
of the Makhtab al-Khidamat, or MAK, which was the direct predecessor of al Qaeda. 
Over the course of the next few years, the MAK would go on to establish satellite offices 
around the world in order to spread their message of jihad, much to Azzam’s delight.30 
The following year, the American government made a major mistake by granting Abdel 
Rahman, who was had been on a terrorist watch list for the previous few years, a visa to 
come to the United States via the American consulate in Sudan, which subsequently 
allowed Abdel Rahman to meet Ramzi Yousef and carry out the 1993 World Trade 
                                                          
29 Scott, 105-6 
30 The growing rift between Azzam, who wanted to focus on establishing a caliphate in Afghanistan, and 
Abdel Rahman and bin Laden, who wanted to focus on waging jihad around the globe, would eventually 
lead to Azzam’s assassination the following year. 
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Center bombing.31 As Tom Copeland observed, one of the biggest mistakes the Clinton 
administration made in the immediate aftermath of the WTC bombing was treating the 
attack as a criminal matter to be handled by local police, rather than a national security 
problem that would have allowed the FBI and CIA to probe deeper into the lives of the 
suspects.32  
 One of the most visible individuals who believed that there was indisputable 
evidence of a correlation between the CIA and al Qaeda was former British MP Robin 
Cook. In an article published in The Guardian a few days after the July 2005 London 
bombings, Cook wrote: 
Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by 
western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA 
and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of 
Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally "the database", was originally the 
computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and 
trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians. Inexplicably, and 
with disastrous consequences, it never appears to have occurred to 
Washington that once Russia was out of the way, Bin Laden's organisation 
would turn its attention to the west.33 
 
If one thinks that America’s involvement with the Afghanistan mujahedeen ended 
with the Soviet departure of Afghanistan in 1989, they are, tragically, sadly mistaken. As 
Peter Dale Scott outlines, after the collapse of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991, 
many American petroleum companies, desperate as ever for more sources of revenue, 
                                                          
31 Peter Lance, "Blowback: The Potential Lethal Fallout from the Secret CIA-Saudi Deal to Arm the Syrian 
Rebels." The Huffington Post. January 26, 2016. Accessed February 15, 2018. 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-lance/blowback-the-potential-le_b_9073374.html. 
32 Copeland, Fool me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism, 25. 
33 Robin Cook, (8 July 2005). "The Struggle against Terrorism Cannot be Won by Military Means" The 
Guardian. London: theguardian.com. 
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began to carefully eye many of the emerging breakaway Soviet republics as lucrative 
places to drill for black gold. As a result, when Pakistan and Afghanistan ordered the 
Arab Afghans who were still in their respective countries to leave, most of the Tajik and 
Uzbek members of the mujahedeen simply proceeded to return to their homelands, the 
newly-established republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where they proceeded to sow 
discord there, much to the delight of American oil companies. The biggest mujahedeen 
operation in these breakaway former Soviet republics, however was in Azerbaijan. There, 
several former Air Force officers who were involved in the Iran-Contra scandal assisted 
Arab Afghans through a company they founded called MEGA Oil This company was 
contracted by the H.W. Bush administration to examine the feasibility of constructing an 
oil pipeline stretching from Azerbaijan to Turkey. Another unfortunate tragic side effect 
of this scandalous meddling in Azerbaijani affairs was the fact that the Afghani heroin, 
whose manufacture had been halted by the Soviets during their time in Afghanistan, 
started flowing once again, this time to Chechnya via Azerbaijan. This very well may 
have been a concentrated covert effort to get the invading Russian troops addicted to this 
terrible narcotic. After bin Laden set up a non-government organization (NGO) in the 
Azerbaijani capital of Baku for the purpose of training terrorists and sending them 
elsewhere, al Qaeda’s presence in the former Soviet Union’s footprint in Central Asia 
was permanently solidified.34 
 A few short years later, al Qaeda, the American government, and the oil 
industry’s paths would cross yet again in the most unlikely of places – Kosovo. In 
another unfortunate application of the famous phrase “the enemy of my enemy is my 
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friend,” al Qaeda and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ended up 
supporting the same rebel group in the Kosovo Conflict: the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA or UCK). Amazingly and tragically, the United States had designated the KLA as a 
terrorist organization due to their participation in the heroin trade. In 1998, most 
Americans who were following the American involvement in Kosovo on the news were 
mystified as to why America decided to get involved there in the first place. As it turns 
out, the instability in Kosovo was seen by oil executives as a troublesome stumbling 
block which stood in the way of the construction of yet another pipeline, this time 
through the Balkans.35  
In the defense of the CIA, however, it is almost certain that neither Charlie 
Wilson or anyone else in the CIA could have possibly predicted that the mujahedeen 
would have the gall to bite the hand that fed them. Although there were certainly red 
flags that certain members of the mujahedeen were deserving of extra surveillance after 
the Soviets left, Langley unfortunately opted to approach the mujahedeen with a rather 
callous “set-it-and-forget-it” mindset after their job was done. Also, rather depressingly, 
the CIA’s history of not fully thinking through the future consequences of their covert 
operations at the expense of future bloodshed goes back much further than the average 
American is aware. Back during World War II, the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), led by “Wild” Bill Donovan, gave almost identical assistance to 
Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh (who were, ironically, Communist) in order to stave off 
Japanese occupation of French Indochina. Fifteen short years later, Minh and his Viet 
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Cong showed their gratitude to Uncle Sam by sucking the United States into what is still 
to this day America’s bloodiest conflict since World War II: the Vietnam War36. That 
being said, it is very easy to understand why, given the considerable humiliation America 
suffered in Vietnam at the hands of the Moscow and Beijing-supported Viet Cong, 
America would want to give the Soviet Union a taste of their own medicine as soon as 
possible. In addition, anyone with even a modicum of compassion towards humanity 
would have wanted to help the horrifically oppressed people of Afghanistan in beating 
back the mighty Red Army.  
Aside from the Soviet-Afghan War, there was another example in the 1980s of 
America assisting a foreign power in a conflict only for it to come back to haunt them 
later on, albeit fortunately not as severely as Afghanistan. During that decade, Iran 
became embroiled in a fierce conventional war with their next-door neighbor Iraq. Given 
the day-and night differences in the way the two countries were ruled (theocracy in Iran 
vs. secular dictatorship in Iraq), a clash between the two countries seemed inevitable. Due 
to the fierce animosity that had developed between the United States and Iran as a result 
of the 1979 Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis, the United Sates made the 
rather cynical decision to provide Iraq with various means of support throughout the war. 
After this long and bloody war concluded, Saddam would go on to use many of the 
weapons the United States provided them in their invasion of Kuwait in 1990, setting the 
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stage for the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which was won handily by the United States in a 
matter of weeks.37 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the CIA is far from the first organization to 
employ proxies to do their dirty work. As Idean Salehyan posits, many other foreign 
countries have enlisted the help of less-than-honorable groups to harass their enemies and 
maintain a safe distance from any real conflict. One of the most well-known examples 
cited by Salehyan is Iran’s well-documented support of the terrorist organizations Hamas 
and Hezbollah, whose attacks in both Lebanon and Israel have resulted in the latter 
becoming Iran’s most bitter enemy since the 1979 Revolution. Another organization that 
was created by a foreign party in order to create the illusion of plausible deniability was, 
surprisingly, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO. This organization was 
created by the Arab League with the objective of pestering Israel to the point that it 
would no longer be considered feasible to stay in what was considered to be Arab 
territory. Salehyan carefully analyzes the primary reasons that nations delegate the duties 
of war to rebels. The first reason he discusses is when the expected casualties of warfare 
are high and the tolerance of such costs is correspondingly low. The United States, at this 
particular time, could not be a better example of this logic, as the horrific and needless 
devastation that the Vietnam War had wrought on America’s psyche meant that the 
country had no desire to be sucked into another potentially endless conflict that could 
possibly cost more American lives.38 
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At first glance, it is quite easy for one to jump to the conclusion that the American 
government’s ignorance and hubris opened the door to 9/11 and the numerous attacks 
inflicted on American targets throughout the course of the 1990s. To be fair, that 
assessment is partially correct, as the CIA should certainly have pushed Pakistan harder 
to allow them to give aid to the more moderate mujahedeen rebels, not to mention they 
should have learned from their mistakes in Vietnam about giving aid to organizations that 
may come back to haunt them in the future. In addition, the CIA and State Department 
should have conducted thorough background checks on the mujahedeen fighters that they 
admitted into the United States. Likewise, the CIA and State Department should have 
established better communications overall between the two agencies. Alas, like almost 
everything else in life, the truth is much more complicated. 
As we shall explore next, although the CIA should certainly not be let off the 
hook entirely for their role in creating the Taliban and al Qaeda, there was in fact, an 
equally, if not more, guilty party in creating this “Frankenstein monster”. Depressingly, 
this party was one of America’s closest Asian allies during the bulk of the Cold War. In 
closing, no other country better epitomized the famous historical adage “the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend”, better than Pakistan. For most of its relatively short history, 
Pakistan has been a relatively passive observer on the world stage. Unfortunately, 
subsequent developments would steer this emerging power in a much more bellicose 
direction. 
Part II: Are the Taliban and al Qaeda entirely America’s Fault? 
In order to better understand the Taliban, it would be very wise to lay out the 
circumstances in which the Taliban as we know them today came to be. Although the 
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men who founded the Taliban first rose to prominence as members of the mujahedeen 
during the Soviet-Afghan War, the Taliban proper actually was founded in 1994 during 
the aforementioned Afghan Civil War. As Ahmed Rashid describes, the Taliban 
originated in Kandahar as the victorious party of a considerable amount of infighting 
among militant Pashtuns in the city. The reason as to why the Taliban were able to 
succeed can best be explained by looking at why the Nazis were able to come to power in 
Germany. As the old saying goes, “desperate times call for desperate measures”, as the 
citizens of both countries were willing, regardless of the consequences, to be ruled by a 
party that offered long-term stability.1 
 The name Taliban is the plural form of the Arabic word talib, or student. These 
students were taught at various madrassas, the Islamic equivalent of seminaries in the 
Christian faith. Mullah Omar, who founded the Taliban, underwent religious instruction 
at Darul Uloom Haqqania, one of Pakistan’s most well-known madrassas. As several 
other prominent founding members of the Taliban also studied at this institution, the 
chancellor of this institution, Maulana Sami ul-Haq2 is considered by many scholars to be 
the true “Father of the Taliban”. He considered the mujahedeen’s military campaign 
against the Soviet Union in the 1980s to be a legitimate jihad, flat out denying that the 
madrassa sent its students to fight for the mujahedeen. Instead, he claimed that the 
madrassa students who joined the mujahedeen did so of their own accord. He also 
                                                          
1 Another interesting parallel noted by Michael Griffin was the negative effects that the Taliban’s 
discriminatory policies against women had on the nation’s productivity levels.  Before the Taliban came to 
power, a staggering 25% of the people working in Afghanistan’s government were women. When the 
Taliban ordered these women to leave the workplace and become homemakers, Afghanistan, like Germany 
when they began sending various productive members of minority groups to concentration camps, began to 
struggle even more. 
2 No relation to Abdul Haq. 
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declared that the numerous claims that terrorists were being trained in the madrassas to be 
nothing more than baseless Western propaganda. He then proceeded to argue that 
America’s invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11 was just as much a violation of 
Afghanistan’s sovereignty and a justification for jihad as the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan more than twenty years earlier. Finally, ul-Haq noted that the bulk of the 
donations that fund the madrassa’s operations comes from the poor part of the Islamic 
community, not unlike the working-class Catholics who frequently donate to fund the 
operations of that church’s seminaries.3 
 The gradual transformation of Pakistan from a secular state to a religious one was 
the primary reason for Pakistan’s decision to support the mujahedeen fighters that would 
eventually become the core of the original Taliban leadership. Although Pakistan was 
originally created as a safe haven for India’s Muslims in the wake of their independence 
from Great Britain, the nation was not ruled as an Islamic theocracy. All of that changed, 
however, when general Muhammad Zia ul-Haq4 deposed President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto5 
in a military coup. After he came to power, Zia embarked on an aggressive campaign to 
Islamize the country’s legal system through a process that would come to be known as 
“Sharization”. Under this policy, the previously secular bureaucracy of Pakistan became 
increasingly permeated by religious officials. These decisions by Zia to Islamize the 
government should not have come as a surprise to anyone, as his religious piety was 
evident even before India broke away from Great Britain, as evident by the frustration 
expressed by his superiors in the British Army at his refusal to conform to the 
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Westernized ways of his peers. This steadfast devotion to his beliefs would be taken to an 
even greater extreme when he became an officer and closed down the mess hall during 
the Ramadan fasting period. Many people who knew Zia as a child attributed his extreme 
religious piety to the fact that his father was just as devout of a Muslim. In a 1978 
interview with the BBC, Zia, when asked if he was a puritan, simply said “All I can say is 
that I try to be a practicing Muslim. If in the process, I can be termed a puritan, it is up to 
those who judge… [I]f one can bring back Islam in its purity, it would be a good thing.” 
Zia would later go on to repeatedly claim that he had been sent on a mission by Allah 
himself to purify Pakistan. Considering that, as previously mentioned, Pakistan was 
founded as a place for India’s Muslim population to practice their faith without fear of 
persecution, one can only wonder why it took so long for Sharia to officially become part 
of government policy. 
 Zia himself posited on this topic:  
The basis of Pakistan was Islam. The basis of Pakistan was that the 
Muslims of the sub-continent are a separate culture. It was on the two-
nation theory that this part was carved out of the sub-continent as 
Pakistan. And in the last 30 years in general but more so in the last seven 
years there has been a complete erosion of the moral values of our society. 
You will hear that Pakistan is full of corruption today. In spite of on-and-
a-half years of Martial Law, corruption is at large, people are dishonest; 
they want to make money overnight. All this is not my feeling but fact. 
The moral fiber of the society has been completely broken and this was 
done basically in the last seven and a half years. Mr. Bhutto’s way of 
flourishing in this society was by eroding its moral fiber… He eroded the 
moral fiber of the society by pitching the students against the teachers, 
sons against the fathers, landlords against the tenants, and factory workers 
against the mill owners… The economic ills of the country are not because 
Pakistan is incapable of economic production. It is because Pakistanis 
have been made to believe that one can earn without working… Therefore, 
to my mind the most fundamental and important basis for the whole 
reformation of society is not how much cotton we can grow or how much 
wheat we can grow. Yes, they are in their own place important factors; but 
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I think it is the moral rejuvenation which is required first and that will 
have to be done on the basis of Islam, because it was on this basis that 
Pakistan was formed… We are going back to Islam not by choice but by 
the force of circumstances. If we had chosen we might as well have stayed 
with India. What was wrong with that?... It is not because of anything 
other than our cultural and moral awareness that Islam is our only 
salvation… Islam from that point of view is the fundamental factor. It 
comes from before wheat and rice and everything else. I can grow more 
wheat; I can import wheat but I cannot import the correct moral values.6  
 Like Zia, Mullah Omar had been exposed to religion from an early age, primarily 
through his father, who was a religious instructor in their community until he tragically 
passed away while Omar was still a child. As he got older, Omar became increasingly 
devoted to his religious studies, associating with other like-minded peers in Kandahar, as 
opposed to the other more well-off folks their age who could afford to do nothing other 
than smoke hashish. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Omar followed in 
the footsteps of his fellow scholars and joined the resistance against the Soviet invasion. 
While out on the front lines, he was wounded several times, with one of the injuries 
resulting in the loss of his right eye. After the Soviet withdrawal, Omar largely laid low 
and served as the imam of a ramshackle mosque in Kandahar during the early stage of the 
Afghan Civil War. Around this time, a band of Taliban leaders realized that Omar’s low 
profile and lack of political experience would, paradoxically, make him an excellent fit to 
be the organization’s next leader. Over the next few years, the Taliban’s tendency to 
swiftly hand out justice – much like the Nazis’ SA, combined with a healthy amount of 
financial backing from Pakistan’s ISI, made the Taliban’s power and popularity grow to 
the point that they were eventually able to take over all of Afghanistan.7 
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Despite the prevailing narrative that the CIA was unintentionally responsible for 
the eventual formation of the Taliban, considerable scholarly evidence exists that the 
reality was nowhere near as cut-and-dry. As Michael Rubin notes, there were many other 
variables that made Afghanistan particularly vulnerable to the possibility of a group like 
the Taliban eventually seizing power. Of all these variables, none was as significant as 
Pakistan. As Steve Coll mentions, Pakistan’s intelligence agency Inter-Services Agency 
(ISI) served as the chief intermediary between the CIA and the mujahedeen.8 Another 
author from the ISI side of the situation, Mohammad Yousaf, further elaborated on the 
relationship between the two national intelligence agencies and the mujahedeen. 
Emphasizing the fact that, in spite of popular opinion to the contrary, the CIA never 
provided training to the mujahedeen. Washington’s direct involvement in the conflict was 
limited to providing funding and shipping weapons to Pakistan, with occasional 
government check-ins being provided by CIA Director William Casey and a one-time 
visit by Charlie Wilson.9 Although the CIA may have never directly trained the 
mujahedeen, they had plenty of blood on their hands both literally and figuratively. As 
Coll once again observes, just as the CIA had feared, many of the Stinger missiles 
supplied by the CIA eventually fell into the wrong hands after Moscow withdrew in 
1989. Another major misstep and textbook example of blowback is how the ISI would 
later go on to use their experience in training the mujahedeen to train operatives for 
another flareup in Pakistan’s seemingly eternal conflict with India over Kashmir.10  
                                                          
8 Coll, Ghost Wars, 73. 
9 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Battle for Afghanistan: The Soviets Versus the Mujahideen 
during the 1980s. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 1992) 148 
10 Coll, Ghost Wars, 371. 
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Another common theme among scholars attempting to diminish the CIA’s role in 
creating the Taliban is the role of the Pakistani government – specifically their 
intelligence agency the ISI, in enabling the Taliban to remain in power after winning the 
Afghan Civil War in 1996. Sean P. Winchell notes that although the Taliban appeared to 
be on its way to victory early on in the conflict, the eventual involvement of the ISI in the 
conflict11 all but assured Taliban rule in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.12 
Yet another Pakistan-related factor whose importance to the Soviet-Afghan war 
cannot be denied is Bank of Credit and Commerce International, or BCCI. This 
institution, which appropriately enough, was founded by a Pakistani, became a rather 
convenient way for the CIA to launder the money that they used to fund the mujahedeen. 
Further corroborating these allegations is the fact that CIA director William Casey met 
with BCCI founder and president Agha Hasan Abedi. After Senators John Kerry and 
Hank Brown delivered a blistering report in 1991 exposing the numerous ties between the 
CIA and this controversial money-laundering institution, the BCCI suddenly found 
themselves discredited by the international community and ceased operations shortly 
after.13 
As Peter Dale Scott points out, Pakistan, by way of the ISI, were the sole 
gatekeepers who decided who, among the various mujahedeen groups, would benefit 
from the financial support and weapons offered by the CIA. As Pakistan was initially 
founded as a safe haven for India’s Muslims after the latter declared independence from 
                                                          
11 Interestingly, according to Winchell, at the insistence of an American oil company. 
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Great Britain, it was understandable that the ISI would have an inherent bias toward 
wanting one of the hardline Islamic fundamentalist groups like Hekmatyar’s to succeed 
the Soviets in Afghanistan rather than one of the more moderate secular-leaning groups, 
like the one led by Masood. In fact, as Scott further observes, America had an 
opportunity to guarantee that the more moderate Sufi Pashtun nationalists of Afghanistan 
would have a bigger say by way of the national council known as a Loya Jirga. This 
steadfast preference for Islamic rule in Afghanistan would eventually totally silence these 
moderate Sufis14 out of the national conversation, effectively eliminating any chance for 
Afghanistan to become a secular, Western-style state, with Scott writing: 
The United States missed an important opportunity in 1980 to rectify this 
fundamentalist bias. A loya jirga, or national assembly, convened to 
represent all of Afghanistan’s divergent groups, called for a loose federal 
structure, nonaligned foreign policy, and nonsectarian Islam. Although the 
loya jirga was praised by the Christian Science Monitor for its 
representative character, the United States did not intervene when the ISI 
scuttled the venture by threatening to cut off the supply of U.S. weapons. 
The religious consequence of this unbalanced ISI support was that the 
traditional moderate Sufism that had been widespread in Afghanistan, and 
was represented by one of the two traditionalist parties, lost ground to the 
radical Salafi Islamism that was favored by Saudi Arabia as well as the ISI 
and its factions. 28 This mirrored a longtime evolution inside Pakistan, 
where traditional Sufism had also been eroded by state-assisted radical 
elements, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam, backed by 
Pakistan president Muhammad Zia-ul Haq.15 
 Scott then proceeds to levy even more astonishing accusations against Pakistan 
regarding their financial involvement in the September 11th attacks. As Scott argues, 
Lieutenant-General Mahmoud Ahmad, who was director of the ISI the day the planes 
struck the World Trade Center, ordered London-born terrorism financier Ahmed Omar 
                                                          
14 As followers of Islam’s mystical traditions, the Sufis interpreted jihad to mean internal personal struggle, 
not the external militant warfare practiced by the mujahedin. 
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Saeed Sheikh to wire 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta $100,000 shortly before the attacks. 
Rather suspiciously, a little over a week after the September 11th attacks, President 
George W. Bush gave a famous speech in which he plainly warned world leaders “you 
are either with us, or with the terrorists.” This subsequently resulted in Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf quickly dismissing Ahmad from his post at the ISI. Even 
more strangely, despite the fact that numerous mainstream news publications had written 
about these shocking connections between Pakistan and the 9/11 hijackers, the subject 
was not brought up once during the congressional 9/11 Commission hearings. According 
to Scott, the Pakistani government was successfully able to get the 9/11 Commission to 
sweep these allegations under the rug by handsomely paying off lobbyists to not bring up 
this potentially explosive connection. Even more interesting is the fact that Daniel Pearl, 
the Wall Street Journal investigative reporter who was gruesomely beheaded in Pakistan 
in 2002, had been utilizing Ahmad as part of his inquiry about the connections between 
the ISI and Islamic militants.16 
 
The CIA-Pakistan Connection. 
To sum things up, when the American government and the CIA made the initial 
decision to assist the mujahedeen in their jihad against the Soviet Union, Pakistan insisted 
that they either help whoever served their interests, or not help at all. Given America's 
recent experience with the revolution in Iran, the last thing anyone that Washington 
wanted was to have more radical Muslims on our bad side. Unfortunately for America, 
                                                          
16 Scott, 117-9. 
   
 
34 
 
given the recent transformation of Pakistani society, accomplishing this goal of assisting 
the more moderate members of the mujahedeen would turn out to be a rather herculean 
task. 
Although America knew that there were certain mujahedeen leaders such as 
Ahmad Shah Masood that would likely pose little to no threat to the United States once 
the Soviet-Afghan conflict was over, Pakistan’s status as the mujahedeen’s trainer and 
financial gatekeeper meant that America’s hands were effectively tied in terms of who 
they could and could not support in their clandestine effort to keep the Soviet Union as 
far away from the Middle East as possible. To America’s credit, after the Soviets 
withdrew from Afghanistan, the United States did everything that it could to get the more 
moderate mujahedeen like Masoud involved in the governance of post-Soviet 
Afghanistan, most importantly by inviting him to participate in the interim coalition 
government that would rule Afghanistan until a more stable ruler could be found. 
A final important thing to keep in mind when discussing how much guilt the CIA 
should bear for the mujahedeen’s post-Soviet actions is the fact that this was the first time 
they supported an opposition group that had an explicitly religious slant to it. When the 
CIA had previously supported anti-Communist rebels in the Cold War, these 
organizations were strictly secular in nature. The infusion of religion into the mix was an 
entire new ballgame for the American government. With that in mind, one can make the 
compelling argument that the “blowback” that befell the United States in the decade 
following the Soviet-Afghan conflict was simply a “rookie mistake” as a result of woeful 
inexperience dealing with militant religious groups. As we shall discuss next, institutional 
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ineptness played a considerable role in America failing to thwart al Qaeda from carrying 
out numerous attacks on American targets over the course of the following decade.
Chapter III: American Intelligence Failures and Successes 
Why was America so Blind? 
 As the previous two chapters demonstrate, Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman was not 
the only blind person in these early years of the War on Terror. At first glance, it is easy 
to chalk up America’s ignorance of the Islamic terrorist threat to the fact that the 
terrorists who carried out attacks in the Middle East were too far from America to pose a 
serious threat, with the American government likely believing that Islamic terrorists were 
not willing to go through the trouble of flying all the way to the other side of the globe to 
wreak havoc. In actuality, the CIA and State Department likely simply thought that 
Islamic terrorists were not logistically capable of carrying out an attack on American soil, 
naively believing that, funds they provided the mujahedeen aside, they were likely too 
poor to both travel to America to carry out an attack and acquire the various materials 
needed to build a sufficiently dangerous bomb. Moreover, a major terrorist attack had not 
occurred on American soil in almost twenty years prior to the World Trade Center 
bombing, the last being a series of non-lethal acts of property destruction by the radical 
left-wing group Weather Underground.  
Another thing to keep in mind was that during the 1980s, The War on Drugs was 
considered America’s chief domestic concern, with the gang warfare resulting from the 
emerging crack cocaine epidemic becoming a particularly pressing public safety issue.1 
                                                          
1 Ironically enough, one of the most dangerous of these drugs, heroin and opiates/opioids, had their chief 
ingredient, the poppy plant, cultivated widely throughout Afghanistan. 
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This was not only the only problem this epidemic posed to America’s inner cities, 
however. The highly addictive nature of this particular form of cocaine often resulted in 
users becoming homeless, not only becoming an economic drain on society, but also 
often frightening people who encountered these addicts on the streets. 
Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was considered by many to be the end 
of the last serious threat to American security. This idea that the fall of the Soviet Union 
would usher in a new era of global stability was famously popularized by Francis 
Fukyama’s 1989 essay The End of History, in which he predicted that the end of the Cold 
War would eventually result in the rest of the world adopting capitalism and liberal 
democracy as its’ default economic and political systems.2 
 America continued to disregard the threat posed by Islamic terrorism even after 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. One excellent example of this ignorance being 
called out in popular culture was during a scene in Michael Moore’s 1995 satirical war 
movie Canadian Bacon, where an American general dismisses the President’s suggestion 
of declaring war on international terrorism to increase his sagging approval ratings by 
saying “Well, sir, we’re not going to reopen missile factories just to fight some creeps 
running around in exploding rental cars, are we sir?”3 Ironically, America was forced to 
finally improve its antiterrorism laws earlier that year when a truck bomb destroyed the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. 
 Andrew C. McCarthy outlines the numerous red flags that the American 
government ignored in the years preceding the many attacks al Qaeda carried out on 
                                                          
2 http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm. 
3 Canadian Bacon, DVD, Directed by Michael Moore, Dog Eat Dog Films, 1995. 
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American targets from 1993 to 2001. As a lawyer who was involved in the trials of the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, McCarthy asserts that the gravest mistake the 
American government made in the early years of confronting Islamic terrorist attacks on 
American soil was their decision to try the terrorists in civilian, rather than military 
courts. As terrorist attacks are acts of war, it would only be appropriate for these religious 
warriors to be tried in the same court as traditional warriors.4  
In addition, he also believes that agencies like the FBI lack the ability to prevent 
acts of terrorism since they are focused on solving crimes that have already been 
committed instead of preventing future crimes. In other words, agencies like the FBI have 
a more reactive approach to investigating terrorism, while agencies like the CIA have a 
more proactive approach. As a result, the CIA is considerably more well-suited than the 
FBI to prevent terrorist attacks before they happen.5  
To the federal government’s credit, McCarthy acknowledges that two years 
before the first attack on the Twin Towers, the FBI successfully planted former Egyptian 
Army officer Emad Salem as a mole in Abdel-Rahman’s inner circle. However, the FBI 
dropped the ball yet again in this case by letting Salem out of their sight even though he 
was shown on video building bombs. McCarthy has a more cynical theory as to why the 
FBI terminated their relationship with Salem: they wanted to wash their hands of any 
potential liability in the event that Abdel-Rahman’s group actually succeeded in carrying 
out an attack.6 
                                                          
4 Andrew C. McCarthy, Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad. New York: Encounter Books, 2005) 3-5. 
5 Ibid, 10. 
6 Ibid, 9-13. 
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 Erik J. Dahl opines that one of the biggest mistakes made by intelligence agencies 
over the past few decades was their emphasis on technical intelligence, such as gathering 
information via wiretapping or computer hacking, as opposed to human intelligence, 
which involves more traditional forms of espionage. Most intelligence experts agree, 
however, that regardless of whether one emphasizes technical or human intelligence 
when trying to thwart a surprise attack, terrorism poses a unique challenge to those 
collecting intelligence because of the scattered nature of terrorist networks compared to 
the more centralized nature of a military established by a government. Additionally, 
intelligence related to terrorism is particularly hard to come by because terrorists rely 
much more on the element of surprise than conventional military operations.7 
 When it came to technical intelligence, although the American intelligence 
community focused more on this type of intelligence-gathering, it did a fairly poor job of 
it. Since Islamic terrorists seldom used telecommunications to plan out their attacks, this 
was not a particularly useful way to gather information. When the internet came into 
existence later in the decade, it became a godsend for technical intelligence proponents 
since it made it significantly easier for terrorists around the globe to formulate their plans. 
 Due to this scarcity of technical intelligence when it came to gathering 
information about terrorist activities, human intelligence became virtually the only way to 
find out exactly what these terrorists were up to. Unfortunately, the CIA had virtually no 
clue how to infiltrate radical Islamic organizations like MAK or Hezbollah. Ironically, as 
                                                          
7 Erik J. Dahl, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence against Terrorism.” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, 2005 (1): 34-6. 
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shown by the actions of Ali Mohamed, the terrorists were easily able to infiltrate 
America’s armed forces. 
 Reluctance to better utilize human intelligence was not the only way America 
made itself vulnerable to Islamic terrorism in the years immediately following the Cold 
War. The FBI and CIA, who have historically been the two agencies most responsible for 
collecting information on those wishing to do harm to America, have long been 
embroiled in a bitter rivalry.  
As Mark Riebling explains, one interesting superficial source of animosity 
between the two organizations comes as a result of the contrasting cultures between the 
two organizations. The CIA has historically been staffed by Ivy League-educated, upper-
class, and intellectual types. The FBI, on the other hand, was seen as a more blue-collar, 
average Joe kind of workplace, whom the CIA effectively dismissed as glorified 
policemen.  
The CIA and FBI’s relationship was not always this rocky. After the CIA’s 
inception as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, they and the 
FBI kept a reasonably safe, but respectable distance from one another, with Langley 
focusing on overseas intelligence gathering while J. Edgar Hoover and his “G-men” 
aimed their sights on organized crime.  
Riebling is not the only author to highlight the numerous institutional defects in 
the FBI and CIA that limited their capabilities to address the growing terrorist threat that 
emerged in the 1990s. Amy Zegart argues that the CIA was initially crippled from its’ 
inception in terms of how far its’ investigative reach could extend. When the initial 
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Congressional proceedings occurred in 1947 to establish the Agency, the FBI and 
military intelligence units were vehemently opposed to the idea of a central agency 
consolidating two traditionally separate institutions for collecting intelligence. 
Additionally, with the horrors of the Holocaust fresh in everyone’s minds, the CIA’s 
wings were clipped from the get-go in order to (understandably) prevent the agency from 
mutating into an American version of the Gestapo.   
In addition, Zegart highlights several examples of where the federal government, 
not only the FBI, was slow to technologically adapt to changing times. Some rather 
humorous examples include the fact that the U.S. Army maintained a horse cavalry right 
up through World War II, that American customs officers asked incoming large vessels 
how many cannons they had on board up to the mid-1990s, and that the U.S. Agriculture 
Department was required by federal law to maintain field offices within a day’s 
horseback ride of anywhere in the continental United States.  At the FBI, the situation 
was not much better, as the majority of the agency’s computers were embarrassingly 
obsolete, an unforgivable sin during the period when the internet was coming of age. To 
paint a picture of just how obsolete the FBI’s computers were during this time-period, 
they relied on function keys in order to input commands instead of the point-and-click 
system used with mice, not to mention that most of the computers were so slow that faxes 
were preferable to emails for sending vital information. Another major related 
technological difficulty which plagued the FBI’s gradual transition to a mostly paperless 
workplace was the fact that approximately half of the FBI’s six billion pages of records 
were still being stored as paper files instead of on computers.   
   
 
41 
 
Another important weakness that Zegart cites regarding why government agencies 
like the FBI and CIA are relatively slow to adapt to change is the fact that, unlike the 
private sector, government bureaucracies do not have to worry about potentially going 
out of business if they fail to keep up with the times. In addition, unlike businesses, who 
are solely controlled by those who want them to succeed, the two-party system that exists 
in the United States means that the opposing party to whomever is currently in power 
would benefit considerably if government agencies fail to live up to the expectations of 
their citizens. Another problem that arises concerning the ability of the FBI and CIA to 
adapt to change comes from the reluctancy of two of the three branches of the 
government to push for institutional reform. The President, for example, is surprisingly 
relatively weak in terms of what he can do to reform government agencies considering 
how much he has to get done in a minimum of four years, barring a major crisis/scandal 
involving one of these agencies (ex. Watergate). In regards to the legislative branch, 
although they are not bound by term limits like the President is, they nonetheless have 
their own series of hurdles to overcome if they wanted to get serious about institutional 
reform within the federal bureaucracy. The biggest of these obstacles is the fact that 
members of Congress have a much closer connection to their constituents than the 
President. Accordingly, the average American voter has little to no concern about what 
the FBI and/or CIA is up to,  which means that, compared to the countless other concerns 
that the average member of Congress has to deal with, the day-to-day operations and 
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culture of the FBI and CIA were way at the back of the line in terms of vital matters to 
federal legislators.8 
All of these above examples show that inter-agency conflict was not the only 
stumbling block the federal government encountered when it came to how it could 
prevent acts of terrorism. Embarrassingly outdated technology and the inability for either 
Congress or the President to enact meaningful bureaucratic reforms before they become a 
problem also have historically prevented the federal government from efficiently 
combating terrorist threats both foreign and domestic. 
The Watergate scandal proved to be a watershed moment when it came to the 
American public’s view of the federal government. One of the biggest blows to the 
American public’s trust in the federal government was the revelation that Nixon regularly 
utilized both the FBI and the CIA for his own political gain. Congress reacted by 
establishing the Church and Pike Commissions, whose subsequent exposure of the CIA’s 
assassinations of foreign leaders only increased the public’s skepticism of CIA activities. 
This resulted in the FBI and CIA being kept more further apart than at any other point in 
their history, which ended up having the unfortunate unintended side effect of leaving the 
United States particularly vulnerable to outside threats.9  
One of the first historical examples that exposed the communications gap between 
the FBI and CIA was the infamous Jonestown massacre. When Congressman Leo Ryan 
                                                          
8 Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, The FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007). 
9 Mark Riebling, Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War between the FBI and CIA has 
Endangered National Security. 
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decided to investigate the activities of Jones’ People’s Temple, the FBI and CIA thought 
the other agency was responsible for investigating the cult.  
The passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) further limited 
what could be done with the information they obtained from radio operator Mike Carter. 
Passed in response to a series of scandals stemming from the CIA opening people’s 
letters without a warrant, the Act required a request be submitted in writing to a special 
court specifically designated to issue the necessary warrants required to collect evidence 
on suspects. The fact that the penalties for violating FISA were prohibitively harsh made 
agents from both the FBI and CIA reluctant to do anything that could even remotely be 
construed as violating the Act.  
As previously mentioned, this reluctance by the FBI and CIA to further 
investigate the goings-on at Jonestown resulted in Congressman Bryan and NBC News 
taking matters into their own hands. When they arrived in Jonestown, tragedy quickly 
unfolded, as both Congressman Bryan and the NBC News camera crew were shot to 
death by members of People’s Temple. After this, all of the members of Jones’ deranged 
cult infamously either voluntarily drank or were forcibly injected with poisoned Kool-
Aid/Flavor-Aid. The Jonestown case made this FBI/CIA dichotomy particularly complex 
since the cult had temples in two separate locations. In an ideal world, the FBI, which 
normally is responsible for investigating activities within United States borders, should 
have handled the investigation of the People’s Temple’s operations in San Francisco, 
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while the CIA, which is normally tasked with monitoring overseas activities, would have 
investigated what was happening at the main Jonestown in Equatorial Guyana.10  
Any hopes that the relationship between the two agencies would improve in the 
near future were quickly dashed when William J. “Bill” Casey was appointed Director of 
Central intelligence in 1981. Casey’s appointment as CIA chief proved to be a godsend 
for the previously-mentioned neoconservative movement, as Casey sympathized with 
their belief that America was ordained by a higher power to become the world’s sole 
superpower.11 Like OSS founder “Wild” Bill Donovan, Casey harbored a deep distrust of 
the FBI. This likely stemmed from the time after World War II when he worked at 
Donovan’s law firm. 
Another event that certainly further confirmed his suspicions about the Bureau 
were allegations levied against Casey by the FBI. As Ronald Reagan’s campaign 
manager during the 1980 presidential election, he supposedly supplied Chief of Staff Jim 
Baker with then-President Jimmy Carter’s briefing papers before one of their debates.  
Although Casey despised the FBI, he had to cooperate with them regardless. He 
took the job specifically to exert greater personal power over American foreign policy, as 
the saying goes, “with great power comes great responsibility”. In spite of this promise to 
cooperate, the CIA began to increasingly conduct surveillance within America’s borders, 
a jurisdiction which was traditionally considered to squarely be FBI territory.  
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear, YouTube, Directed by Adam Curtis, 
Performed by Adam Curtis. United Kingdom: BBC, 2007. 
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The first test of the FBI and CIA’s newfound ability to cooperate with one another 
came in 1982, when the two agencies joined forces in a historic effort to poach KGB 
agents directly from their Washington station. In 1983, the French embassy in Moscow 
alerted the State Department that they had discovered bugging equipment in their 
building. As American embassies are considered to legally be American soil, the FBI was 
authorized to launch an investigation into possible Soviet surveillance efforts there. One 
of the more startling discoveries that came from this investigation was the revelation that 
a Soviet emigrant who was later revealed to have been a KGB agent was chosen as the 
embassy’s design engineer. The CIA subsequently steadfastly denied that it was possible 
for the Soviets to infiltrate the embassy in the ways that the FBI had suggested, which 
included such ludicrous methods as enlarging chimneys so that midgets or small children 
could sneak into the building or using a “Soviet Spider-Man” to scale the walls of the 
complex.  
The CIA discovered that a trainee named Edward Lee Howard, who went by the 
cryptonym “Robert”, was very likely to be the mole. Red flags were apparent as early as 
in 1983, when a polygraph test revealed that Mr. Howard had stolen from a woman’s 
purse on a commercial flight and used cocaine while employed by the Agency. Even 
more suspicious was the discovery the following year that he had spent considerable time 
loitering around the Soviet embassy in Washington. These failures by the CIA to report 
such alarming behavior in an effort to save face were not only idiotic, but also illegal.12  
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
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1985 in general was an embarrassing year for the CIA and would come to be 
known as The Year of the Spy due to the unusual number of foreign agents that were 
arrested in America’s borders that year. Riebling rightfully points out that foreign 
governments such as China and the Soviet Union were able to do an excellent job 
infiltrating America’s intelligence network.  
Moscow was not the only party guilty of planting spies at Langley, however, as 
Beijing also successfully managed to infiltrate the Agency during the waning decades of 
the Cold War.  One example was Larry Wu-Tai Chin, who subsequently admitted to 
being a spy for communist China for over thirty years. This discovery was only made 
after a mole the CIA had planted in China tipped off the CIA that an American spy had 
suspiciously visited the country for a banquet, which resulted in the FBI discovering a 
customs declaration signed by him after going through airline records. Further adding to 
the CIA’s humiliation/embarrassment was the fact that they had asked him to end his 
three-year retirement the following year and come back as a consultant, even though the 
FBI had begun investigating Chin’s suspicious travels in 1983.13  
 The FBI was not the only government agency to have communication difficulties 
with the CIA. Omar Abdel-Rahman’s entrance into the United States reveals this 
problem. The State Department eventually admitted in a 1993 closed hearing before 
Congress that a lack of communication between them and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) resulted in Abdel-Rahman being issued a visa in spite of not 
being subjected to a background check. The State Department would explain this issue 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
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away by blaming it on the primitive immigration and visa system in Sudan. Furthermore, 
the book goes on to explain how gross technological inadequacy also played a part in 
Abdel-Rahman being mistakenly allowed to enter the United States, as the data used to 
vet visa applicants was stored on microfiche instead of as a computer file.14  
Ramzi Yousef and Omar Abdel-Rahman publicly declared during their trials that 
the ultimate aim of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was to topple one of the Twin 
Towers into the other, which would have caused devastation the like of which New York 
City had never seen. As hard as it is to fathom, the destruction wrought by the WTC 
bombers could have actually been worse. Jonathan B. Tucker made the astonishing 
revelation that the World Trade Center bombers had put sodium cyanide into the bomb 
with the intent of creating a deadly cloud of hydrogen cyanide that would have quickly 
swept up the North Tower and killed everyone inside. This fact was first brought to light 
by federal judge Kevin Duffy at the 1994 sentencing of four of the bombers, but was for 
the most part ignored until March of 1996, when a Senate Committee on Government 
Affairs hearing echoed these suspicions.  
One of those bombers at the sentencing meted out by Judge Duffy was Nidal 
Ayyad, a Rutgers University graduate who worked as a chemical engineer. In a rather 
crafty move, Ayyad used company stationery from his chemical engineer job at Allied 
Signal to purchase ingredients for the explosives without raising suspicion. Even more 
galling was the fact that Ayyad stayed behind and served as the group’s spokesman 
immediately after the attack, while all of his co-conspirators had already fled the country. 
                                                          
14 Julie Farnam, U.S. Immigration Laws Under the Threat of Terrorism. (New York: Algora Publishing, 
2005) 6-7. 
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During this time continued to use his job connections to attempt to purchase chemicals 
for another attack that, he and his group hoped, would be far more successful than the 
World Trade Center one. In spite of all of this, the only evidence supporting the claim 
cyanide was used in the attack was a lone bottle found in Ayyad’s shed that was far too 
small to be used lethally in a bombing.1516 
  
                                                          
15 John V Parachini, "The World Trade Center Bombers (1993)." Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons (2000): 185-206. 
16 After the tragic bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the federal 
government finally realized that terrorism, whether foreign or domestic, was an issue that needed to be 
taken seriously. The result was the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act the 
following year which established the criteria by which the State Department designated terrorist 
organizations and made it a federal crime to either belong to a terrorist organization or raise funds for one. 
The latter two provisions would garner considerable controversy on the grounds that they infringed on 
Americans’ First Amendment rights to freedom of association and freedom of speech. Andy Pearson 
compares the provisions outlawing membership in terrorist organizations and banning fundraising by 
terrorist groups within America’s borders to the infamous “blacklists” that were created during the 
infamous Red Scare of the 1950s. Pearson also saw similarities in the Act to the race-based immigration 
laws that began to be passed by Congress during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, the internment of 
Japanese-Americans during World War II, and the frequent accusations by the Attorneys General of 
Southern states during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s that the NAACP was conspiring to 
violently overthrow the American government. Another potential pitfall of the fundraising ban in the 
AEDPA is that, in many instances, legitimate humanitarian organizations may have either direct or indirect 
ties to a terrorist organization.  One particularly notable application of this predicament was in South Africa 
during the 1980s, when the African National Congress, the leading organization in the fight against 
apartheid, was ruled by Congress to be a terrorist organization. Another provision of the AEDPA that 
would cause widespread criticism in legal circles is the unprecedented restrictions the Act placed on the 
habeas corpus rights of convicted terrorists. For the first time in the nation’s history, a statute of limitations 
was imposed on how long someone convicted of committing an act of terrorism had to file a writ of habeas 
corpus (one year), as well as only receiving one chance to appeal their imprisonment. Prior to this, the only 
other time restrictions were ever placed on habeas corpus were during times of war. Naturally, such a 
draconian rewriting of America’s habeas corpus laws brought out numerous challenges, reviews, and 
appeals in regard to the law’s constitutionality.  
Deborah Stahlkopf believed that Congress did not directly intend to restrict that particular right to such an 
extreme intent, it nonetheless overstepped its boundaries in the name of, as the author frequently describes 
it, “preventing abuse of the writ”.  In the Supreme Court case Felker v. Turpin decided later in 1996, in 
which a man in Georgia was sentenced to death for raping and murdering a woman, it was determined that 
the Act legally prevented both the federal and state courts from entertaining additional habeas corpus 
petitions if the claim was also present in a prior application. The case concurrently ruled that the AEDPA’s 
habeas corpus provisions did not the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution.   
Despite all of these unprecedented measures taken by the federal government in order to prevent another 
terrorist attack, whether by a foreign or domestic enemy, on either American soil or overseas American 
properties, it still tragically was not enough to stop al Qaeda from continuing to wreak havoc on America’s 
interests both home and abroad. 
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 America’s next brush with al Qaeda came in 1996, when a truck bomb exploded 
outside of the Khobar Towers housing complex that was boarding Coalition soldiers who 
were enforcing a no-fly-zone that was being imposed on Iraq. After the attack, official 
blame for the attack was placed on Hezbollah and Iran, although the attack was actually 
carried out by a pro-Khomeini Saudi group which, despite being also called Hezbollah, 
had no other connections besides possible financial assistance to the more well-known 
Hezbollah based out of Lebanon. However, the 9/11 Commission indicated that al Qaeda 
may well have been behind the attack since Osama bin Laden was seen being 
congratulated on the day it occurred.  
A New York Times article published a few months after the attack pointed to 
several several lapses in both judgement and intelligence. The CIA and Air Force had 
grossly underestimated the bombing capabilities of the perpetrators, as seen in the size of 
multiple bombings that had been carried out throughout Saudi Arabia in the months 
preceding the Khobar Towers attack. In addition, the United States Air Force ignored 
recommendations made by the Pentagon to improve the security of the Khobar Towers in 
the aftermath of a car bombing near the U.S. embassy in Riyadh in November of the 
previous year to enlarge the defense perimeter of the base from its current distance of 
eighty feet, and install plastic protective film on the windows of the complex in order to 
prevent glass from becoming a danger. What makes these security errors even more 
baffling is that the infamous 1983 bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut should 
have increased security measures at all of America’s military bases around the globe. The 
CIA and the Pentagon’s were completely clueless as to how dangerous the underground 
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militant groups operating in Saudi Arabia at the time were.17 At the same time, it should 
be noted that the Saudi authorities, who should have kept a closer eye on the militant 
groups that existed within their borders, were steadfastly in denial that any such groups 
existed. 
 Al Qaeda’s next attack on an American target was its bombing of the United 
States embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These attacks also 
made the larger American public aware of Osama bin Laden’s existence at this time, as 
he was added to the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list, where he would remain until his death 
in 2011. As Dilip Hiro explains, suicide bombings such as these became increasingly 
popular with Islamic terrorists due to the fact that the death of the perpetrator make it 
exponentially difficult for investigators to determine both who was responsible for the 
attack and their motive, thereby allowing the responsible organization to carry out more 
attacks unabated.18 It is also worth noting that the miniseries adaptation of Wright’s 
Looming Tower showed that the previously mentioned lack of communication between 
the CIA and FBI was a chief reason the embassy bombing were not stopped in advance.19 
One of the chief reasons the embassy bombings surprised terrorism experts was 
the fact that they took place in East Africa, a comfortable distance from the Middle East, 
where one would typically expect an Islamic terrorist attack to be carried out. At the same 
time, Copeland reminds the reader that a fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden earlier in the 
                                                          
17 Douglas Jehl, John Kifner, and Eric Schmitt, "FATAL LAPSES -- A Special Report.;How U.S. Missteps 
and Delay Opened Door to Saudi Blast." The New York Times, 7 July 1996. Accessed March 29, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/07/world/fatal-lapses-special-report-us-missteps-delay-opened-door-
saudi-blast.html. 
18 Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response. (London: Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2014) 271. 
19 Wright, Looming Tower (2018). 
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year declaring war on the United States should have put the authorities on higher alert. 
That being said, Copeland understands that the United States did not prioritize security, 
making them a particularly easy and vulnerable target for al Qaeda. This is astounding 
considering that American embassies were not on heightened alert since terrorists had 
already attacked US embassies in both Beirut and Riyadh.20 21 
 The last al Qaeda attack on an American target before the September 11th attacks 
was the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, while the ship was 
undergoing a routine refueling. The attack was technically a homecoming of sorts for al 
Qaeda, as Osama bin Laden was originally from Yemen. Happening suspiciously close to 
the controversial 2000 Presidential election, the attack may have been intended to affect 
the outcome of said election. As Lawrence Wright proceeds to explain, the fact that the 
government of Yemen was stubbornly protective of its own image made it unusually 
difficult for the American government to begin investigating the attack. To give an 
example from the book of how much of a hard time Yemen gave the FBI, they actually 
had the gall to demand that they pay them $1 million to dredge the sludge around the site 
of the blast.22 This kind of snobbish behavior on the part of the Yemeni government 
should not really come as that much of a surprise considering the fact that Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen’s immediate neighbor to the north, had long been in steadfast denial that any 
extremist groups were operating within their borders. 
                                                          
20 Copeland, Fool Me Twice, 163-6. 
21 It is also interesting to note that, according to a 2002 article in The New York Times Magazine, this 
attack on those two embassies in Africa very well may never have happened had another attack aiming to 
kill the members of both the English and American national soccer teams during the 1998 FIFA World Cup 
in France not been broken up an astonishing two weeks before the tournament was set to begin. 
22 Wright, 325. 
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 Like Zegart, Lahneman also agrees with the general consensus of intelligence 
experts since the attacks that the CIA’s human intelligence capabilities when it came to 
hunting down al Qaeda were woefully inadequate. This relates to the longstanding 
American emphasis on freedom in that in the years leading up to 9/11, the CIA went to 
great lengths to ensure that the operatives on their payroll had not been previously been 
found guilty of human rights violations, even if they were proven to be more effective 
than operatives with clean records. This “better safe than sorry” approach to human 
intelligence by the CIA would obviously come back to haunt the United States on that 
tragic September morning. In addition, the covert intelligence operations of the CIA were 
also reduced greatly in the years before 9/11, likely as a result of public backlash over the 
Iran-Contra fiasco.23 In spite of this, a well-carried out covert plan involving, say 
Masood’s Northern Alliance, in getting al Qaeda out of Afghanistan would have likely 
saved the lives of countless American servicemen and women and their allies. 
In summation, a combination of communication difficulties between the FBI, 
CIA, and State Department, embarrassingly obsolete technology, and the unwillingness 
of government officials to occasionally push the Bill of Rights to the wayside for the sake 
of national security proved to make a sitting duck for Islamic terrorists. Fortunately, 
however, the American government was able to successfully prevent several potential 
major terrorist attacks from being carried out. 
Intelligence Successes 
                                                          
23Steven C. Boraz, and Thomas C. Bruneau, eds., Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control 
and Effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007) 74-82. 
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 Much criticism has deservedly been levied on the American federal government 
for their mishandling of information and intelligence concerning the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing and the September 11th attacks. Yet the government was able to 
successfully prevent several attacks planned for the American homeland throughout the 
1990s. It is noteworthy that the perpetrators of the successful attacks overseas (i.e. 1996 
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, 1998 Embassy bombings, and 2000 bombing 
of USS Cole in Yemen) never set foot in the United States, making it impossible for the 
FBI to find out anything about their plans. 
 Although America first became acquainted with al Qaeda through the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, serendipity prevented us from learning about them even earlier. 
In December of 1992, members of the U.S. Marines were stationed in Yemen on their 
way to Somalia to participate in Operation Restore Hope, a military action made famous 
by the film Black Hawk Down. The terrorists planted the bomb to kill the Marines but 
only ended up killing an Austrian tourist and a hotel employee and injuring four other 
Austrians. Fortunately, the Marines avoided harm as they had reported to Somalia just 
prior to the attack.24 The American authorities reacted by making sure future troop 
reinforcements headed to Somalia were stationed in a safer country.25  
According to Peter Bergen, American intelligence officials had begun to suspect 
bin Laden of having a role in these bombings as early as April 1993. No further action 
                                                          
24 Wikipedia contributors, "1992 Yemen hotel bombings," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=1992_Yemen_hotel_bombings&oldid=832263393 (accessed 
April 2, 2018). 
25 Wright, 198. 
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was taken to look into any further risk this rather suspicious figure may have posed to the 
United States.26  
 The next scheme was the NYC landmark bomb plot, an event that resulted in the 
arrest of Omar “The Blind Sheikh” Abdel-Rahman. This plot, which was foiled in 1993, 
consisted of blowing up several well-known New York City landmarks and 
transportation hubs such as the Lincoln and Holland tunnels as well as the United Nations 
headquarters. It also involved the assassinations of both United States Senator Alfonse 
D’Amato (R-NY) and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the latter of which was 
scheduled to visit New York City for the annual opening of the United Nations General 
Assembly.27 Emad Salem, the previously mentioned former FBI informant played a key 
role in foiling the attacks by providing the terrorists with phony bomb material.28 
 Another major potential attack the FBI and CIA were able to successfully prevent 
was the infamous Operation Bojinka plot. This plot, which was planned to be global in 
scope, would have involved blowing up eleven airliners bound for the United States, 
crashing a plane into the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and using a suicide 
bomber disguised as a priest to assassinate Pope John Paul II while he was on a trip to the 
Philippines. Like the NYC landmark bomb plot, the Bojinka plot was stopped only a few 
days before it was supposed to take place. The attack was stopped when authorities 
captured Abdul Hakim Murad after he accidentally started a fire in his Manila apartment 
                                                          
26 Bergen, Holy War Inc., 176. 
27 Steven Lee Myers, "Man in New Jersey Is Charged in Plot to Kill Mubarak." The New York Times,  18 
July 1993. Accessed March 28, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/18/nyregion/man-in-new-jersey-
is-charged-in-plot-to-kill-mubarak.html. 
28 Peter Lance, "Salem: The Man Who Risked His Life for America." Peterlance.com. May 23, 2016. 
Accessed March 28, 2018. http://peterlance.com/wordpress/?p=629. 
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while making explosives for the attack. Upon his arrest by the Manila Police, Murad 
claimed the explosions were a result of firecrackers.  
Additionally, Ramzi Yousef planted a bomb under the seat of a jetliner to test 
whether or not the bombs they planned to plant on the America-bound planes would 
successfully detonate. The test blast killed a Japanese businessman but did not destroy the 
aircraft. Yousef thereafter decided to proceed with the attack. However, the 
aforementioned accidental explosion in the Manila apartment that resulted in Murad’s 
arrest would also end up being Yousef’s undoing.  
Yousef confessed to the entire Bojinka plot during his subsequent investigation by 
the FBI. He also planned to assassinate then-U.S. President Bill Clinton on an upcoming 
trip to Manila by planting a bomb under a bridge that the Presidential motorcade was 
scheduled to cross.29 Astonishingly, measures to better screen for bombs aboard aircraft 
cabins would not be implemented until the summer of 2006, which resulted in the current 
restrictions on liquids being carried aboard airliners in a plot to blow up several 
transatlantic flights.  
The link between al Qaeda and the Philippines dates as far back as 1988, when 
Osama bin Laden allegedly sent his brother-in-law Mohammad Jamal Khalifa to the 
Philippines to recruit new members of the mujahedeen from the ranks of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Like Wael Hamza Julaidan, Jamal Khalifa used a local 
charity, named the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) as a front for his 
schemes. However, the greater Filipino connection to the Bojinka plot came courtesy of 
                                                          
29 Mark Ensalaco, Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) 201-2. 
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the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  The ASG’s founder, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalan, had 
undergone training at al Qaeda’s camp in Peshawar, where he became personally 
acquainted with bin Laden and became a close friend of Ramzi Yousef. As a result of this 
close relationship, Yousef traveled to the Philippines by way of Malaysia, where he then 
proceeded to train twenty terrorists and establish the cell that was supposed to carry out 
the Bojinka plot.30  
Saudi Arabia also played an important role in radicalizing Muslims not in both the 
Philippines and Southeast Asia as a whole. Saudi Arabia’s vast oil wealth enabled that 
country to establish Islamic religious schools known as madrassas throughout the world. 
These madrassas propagated the controversial Wahhabi school of Islam to new 
generations of Muslims throughout the world. 
 The FBI was also able to unravel the Millennium bomb plot in December of 1999. 
This particular scheme began to unravel when Ahmed Rassam was pulled over by an 
observant customs inspector at the U.S.-Canada border crossing in Port Angeles, 
Washington. The customs inspector noticed how suspiciously profusely he was sweating. 
Rassam had previously taken up residence in Montreal in order to escape the civil unrest 
that had been plaguing his native Algeria.31 Upon further interrogation, he admitted that 
he was en route to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in order to blow it up as part 
of a worldwide plan to ruin the millennium celebrations for thousands of people. Upon 
further investigation by both the FBI and the CIA, it was revealed that the terrorists had 
                                                          
30 Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Role of Philippine—American Relations in the Global Campaign Against 
Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security." Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (2002): 300-1. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798598. 
31 Montreal was a popular destination for Algerian nationals due to the large Francophone population there, 
as French is the primary language spoken in Algeria. 
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also intended to attack Disneyland in Anaheim, California, and the Space Needle in 
Seattle. The mayor of Seattle went so far as to cancel the New Year’s Eve celebrations 
that were scheduled to take place at the Space Needle. Rassam was found with several 
Casio watches on his person, which happened to be the same timepieces he had intended 
to use as detonators in the foiled Bojinka plot several years earlier.32  
Another al Qaeda cell attempted to blow up the destroyer USS The Sullivans 
while it was docked in the port of Aden in Yemen for refueling on January 3, 2000. But 
the boat carrying the explosives prematurely sank before it could explode next to the 
ship.33 This failed attack very likely influenced al Qaeda’s decision to try blowing up a 
ship there again. Al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole in that same port later that year. 
The most well-known foiled terrorist attack, at least from a local point of view, is far and 
away the infamous Lackawanna Seven plot in 2002. As the name suggests, this 
conspiracy consisted of seven men of Yemeni descent who resided in the city of 
Lackawanna, just outside of Buffalo, New York. The Yemenis began to immigrate to 
Lackawanna in the 1950s, where they began to get jobs in the Bethlehem Steel plant. 
When the Lackawanna Seven first arrived in Western New York, they attended religious 
services at a local mosque where Kemal Derwish, had begun giving sermons to the 
community. Derwish was a fellow Yemeni who would later be killed in a drone strike in 
Yemen along with the alleged mastermind of the USS Cole bombing.  
                                                          
32 Richard Sale, "Terrorists Targeted Disneyland, Space Needle." United Press International, 20 February 
2001. Accessed March 30, 2018. https://www.upi.com/Archives/2001/02/20/Terrorists-targeted-
Disneyland-Space-Needle/9610982645200/. 
33 Dennis Piszkiewicz, Terrorism's War with America: A History (first ed.) (Westport: Praeger, 2003) 123. 
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One of the reasons Derwish’s meetings were so appealing to the Lackawanna 
Seven was that Derwish frequently brought up the various ways in which their fellow 
Muslims were being oppressed across the globe. Shortly afterwards, a visiting imam from 
the Midwest implored them that the only way their souls could be saved was to undergo 
military training – specifically in Afghanistan. Looking for greater meaning in their lives 
than the current nine-to-five routine that the men had been following, they embarked for 
Afghanistan in April 2001 under the guise of going to Pakistan for religious studies. 
While there, they actually met and were addressed by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri 
themselves. However, they left before actually completing their training. In any event, the 
tragic events of September 11th eventually resulted in the passage of the controversial 
PATRIOT Act, which granted the federal government with unprecedented powers to 
wiretap American citizens. As a result, when the FBI began to notice that members of the 
plot had frequently used the word “wedding”, a long-time codeword among Islamic 
terrorists for an attack in emails sent to each other, the FBI eventually was able to arrest 
the Lackawanna Seven.34 After a brief trial, they were convicted of providing material 
support to a foreign terrorist organization and sentenced to up to ten years in prison. 
In spite of the fact that Pakistan played a considerable role in allowing the men 
who would eventually form the core of both the Taliban and al Qaeda to come together, 
not to mention the fact that the CIA should have pushed Pakistan much harder to allow 
them to decide who specifically received their money and weapons, they are not the only 
parties responsible for the existence of these two organizations. Now it is time to finally 
                                                          
34 Mitchell D. Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011) 260-70. 
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determine, once and for all, who ultimately bears the most responsibility for creating al 
Qaeda and the Taliban
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Conclusion 
 As we have seen over the past few chapters, there are many different factors that 
ultimately resulted in the eventual creation of al Qaeda and the Taliban. This beckons the 
question: out of all of these various factors, which was most responsible for them 
becoming as powerful as the did in the 1990s? 
 As previously mentioned, the bulk of the American population has come to 
believe that the responsibility for the creation of al Qaeda and the Taliban falls largely on 
the shoulders of the CIA as it was willing to do anything to guarantee the failure of the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Other, less cynical observers who consider the CIA to be 
the main party responsible for al Qaeda and the Taliban’s rise to power believe that the 
decision to help the mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviet Union was a well-
intentioned but poorly implemented humanitarian gesture. In defense of those who take 
the humanitarian approach, this was the first time in its history that the CIA had lent their 
assistance to a militant Islamic organization, so it was not aware of the possibility that the 
beneficiaries of their aid could someday turn their back on them. Lastly, it is quite 
important to note that only the Shiites were viewed in both the United States and the 
remainder of the Western world as “bad Muslims” in the wake of the 1979 Iranian 
hostage crisis and further bolstered by Hezbollah’s 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marine 
barracks in Beirut. The Sunnis of the world were far less associated with terrorism at that 
time. 
 This brings us to Pakistan. While this nation had largely been a secular and 
peaceful ally of the United States for most of its’ existence, a radical change in 
government at roughly the same time Ayatollah Khomeini was consolidating his power in 
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Tehran transformed the nation into an effective theocracy. Pakistan, an Islamic republic 
supported any and all individuals and organizations that could help boost the image of 
Islam across the globe, something that would go on to have far-reaching and lethal 
consequences for decades to come. Pakistan under repeatedly warned the United States 
that further involvement with the Taliban would cause serious problems. Despite this 
warning from Pakistan, it is well worth remembering that this very country, during this 
time, was basically using both the Taliban and al Qaeda against their longtime 
archnemesis India. 
 Much of CIA’s fault in failing to prevent 9/11, as previously mentioned, was due 
to their founder’s plans for the agency to avoid become “secret police.”. At the same 
time, it is also important to remember that the long-running “rivalry” between the CIA 
and FBI did a tremendous disservice to American security, as greater communication 
between the two agencies would no doubt have resulted in thousands of lives being 
saved. The CIA should also have tried to improve their relationship with the State 
Department, which would have likely resulted in such individuals as Omar “The Blind 
Sheikh” Abdel-Rahman from entering the United States. The State Department, much 
like the, FBI should also have done a considerably better job of staying up to date on the 
latest technological advancements in order to keep themselves a step ahead of America’s 
enemies. Moreover, the FBI was generally unable prevent terrorist acts before they could 
be carried out, since their primary job is to investigate crimes after they have been 
committed. This limit was imposed on the FBI in order to prevent it from becoming too 
powerful. 
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 Religious ideology also played an important role in justifying these attacks in the 
eyes of the terrorists. Al Qaeda and similar groups would not have a plausible reason to 
carry out their attacks without the radical works of such writers as Sayyid Qutb, who, 
after visiting America and concluding that it was a cesspool of vice and hedonistic 
debauchery, believed that the West's only hope of salvation was to either convert to Islam 
or perish. In addition, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s successor as leader of al 
Qaeda, began his career as a terrorist as the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one of the 
most infamous terrorist organizations in the Middle East and a longtime nuisance to 
Egypt’s well-known Muslim Brotherhood which in contrast has long sought to establish 
Islamic theocracies throughout the world by peaceful political means. Also the numerous 
madrassas that operated throughout the Middle East and were funded by countries like 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia tended to use a curriculum that was considerably biased in 
favor of such orthodox Islamic schools as Wahhabism and Salafism. Many terrorist 
groups were Wahhabi or Salafi in orientation and used the schools to find new recruits. 
            American foreign policy was also another important motivating factor in al 
Qaeda’s decision to attack the United States. Typically, America's decision to station 
troops in Saudi Arabia leading up to the first Gulf War is usually the first policy blunder 
brought up when discussing reasons groups like al Qaeda despised America. Another 
major aspect of American foreign policy that has long bothered the bulk of the Muslims 
living in the Middle East is our steadfast support of Israel since the nation's founding in 
1948. One of the first notable public examples of a Middle Eastern country publicly 
punishing America for their support of Israel was when Saudi Arabia cut off American 
access to their cheap oil in retaliation for their support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. 
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The oil embargo resulted in a sharp spike in energy prices throughout the United States 
and briefly plunged the nation into recession, as well as initiating America’s long-term 
decline as a global economic superpower. Another Islamic nation that had publicly 
denounced America's support of Israel is Iran. Iran to this day refers to the US as “the 
great Satan” because of its’ special relationship with Israel. The terrorists themselves 
have Often been motivated by anti-Semitism. For instance, Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 
World Trade Center bomber, testified that the attack was originally planned to be carried 
out in Brooklyn, because they believed more Jews would be killed in an attack there. 
Further proof of the role anti-Semitism has played in their animosity towards the United 
States is the fact that Sayyid Nosair, one of the terrorists convicted in the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, was also accused of assassinating controversial Orthodox Jewish 
rabbi Meir Kahane. 
 Although most people believe that the Taliban and al Qaeda were a “Frankenstein 
monster” created by the CIA, they were only half to blame for their evolution from a 
ragtag band of freedom fighters bent on expelling the Soviet Union from their homeland 
at all costs to one of the most infamous theocratic regimes and terrorist organizations, 
respectively, in recent history. The other chief guilty party responsible for enabling the 
Taliban and al Qaeda to become as strong as it has is Pakistan. Pakistan was determined 
to help out whoever would attack India, their archnemesis. Pakistan also backed the 
Taliban and al Qaeda given their common sympathy for ultraconservative Islam around 
the world. Regardless, the CIA made major mistakes, such as failing to insist on Pakistan 
and the ISI backing more moderate fighters such as Ahmad Shah Masood, instead of 
fundamentalist mujahedeen such as Hekmatyar. Therefore, there is no real single 
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“smoking gun” when it comes to who is responsible for al Qaeda and the Taliban coming 
to power. In addition, the deeply entrenched cultures of the FBI and CIA make it virtually 
impossible to reform them to the point they would be able to effectively communicate 
with each other. This, combined with the fact that Islam was the only viable belief system 
to the Afghani people in the absence of communism means that fundamentalist Islam will 
continue to be a problem for the Western world for the foreseeable future. 
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